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AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS AND ARTIFICIAL
INSEMINATION BIRTHS
Jeffrey A. Parness'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Childbirth can, of course, arise from sex. It can also arise from
assisted reproduction, 1 which, to date, usually involves either "the
introduction of semen ... into a woman's vagina, cervical canal or uterus
through ... artificial means, " 2 the process of artificial insemination (AI),
or the introduction of a fertilized egg into a woman "using gametes" that
are not the woman's "own," in the process of fertilized egg introduction
(FEI). 3 State laws generally govern childcare parentage in the United
States for children born of sex, AI, or FEI, 4 but there are some federal
'Professor Eme1ilus at Nmthem Illinois University College of Law, B.A., Colby College; J D., The
University of Chicago. Many thanks Lo Professor Tracy Thomas and the pa11icipants in the
symposium, "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and the Constitution: How LGBTQ Rights Are
Defined, Protected and Preempted," held on Febrnary 4, 2022 and sponsored by The Center for
Constitutional Law at 1l1e University of Akron School of Law.
I Stale law definiti.ons of assisted rep1oduction can be problematically limited See, e.g., VA.
CODE ANN . ~ 20-156 (West 2019) ("assisted reproduction means a pregnancy resulting from any
intervening medical technology .• . which completely or pmtially replaces sexual intercourse as a
means of.conception." The statute foils to account for do-it-yourselfaitificial inseminalion (as with a
turkey baster)
2 IDAHO CODE~ 39-540(1) (defining a11ificial insemination). A11ificial insemination can
involve a woman who intends to rear the chi Id, or a woman who docs not intend to rear the chi Id, i.e.,
a genetic sunogalc, UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT§ 701 (nonsu1rngacy Al) & § 801(1) (sunogacy Al)
(2017) ("2017 UPA').
3 2017 UPA § 801(2) (defining gestational sun-ogate as limited lo a woman who does not
intend to ,ear the chi Id). See also VA . CODE ANN. § 20-156 ("gestational mother means the woman
who gives bi11h to a child, regardless ofher genetic relationship lo the child"); VA . CODE ANN , § 20158 ('"gestational mothe1" is "the child's mother under law unless she is a sU1rngate")
4, This paper focuses on parentage interests in Lhc ··care, custody, mid control" of Al children,
interes1s that receive federal constitutional protections Troxel v Granville, 530 U.S 57, 65 (2000)
(while the children in T,ore/ were born or consensual sex, 1he1c is no good reason to t1eal Al child1e11
dilfocntly. especially as only in Al settings do the pa11icipants almost always intend p1egna11cy Lo
toll ow) Pa,·entagc 1csponsibilities, as with child suppo11, that follow such bi11hs might dif"lcr in their
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guidelines. 5 The balance in state lawmaking between legislatures and
courts for any particular form of birth varies interstate. The balance within
a single state also often varies depending on the form of birth, including
children born of sex, of nonsurrogacy AI, of nonsurrogacy FEI, of
surrogacy AI (i.e., a genetic surrogate), or of surrogacy FEI (i.e., a
gestational surrogate).
State parentage laws for children born of sex have changed in the last
half century through recognitions of voluntary acknowledgment,
residency/hold out, and de facto parent doctrines. State laws on children
born of surrogacy pacts involving FEI have also evolved. Enforceable FEI
surrogacy pacts provide an avenue to chi Idearc parenthood for some while
recognizing a waiver of childcare interests by others; here, guidelines
usually require medical aid, and perhaps judicial oversight. At least for
now, there are no do-it-yourselfers (DIY) undertaking FEI births.
Pregnancy cannot be accomplished by following a You Tube video.
State laws on children born of nonsurrogacy and surrogacy AI have
also evolved. As with surrogacy FEI births, these laws often speak of AI
with medical oversight. But there can be, and have been, many DIY
pregnancies. Thank you Y ouTube. To date there is no comprehensive
constitutional, statutory, or common law guidance on parentage arising
from Al births involving DIYers.
Childcare parentage issues arising from AI births are subject to
constitutional guidance, including due process, equal protection, and
privacy dictates. Constitutional rights, however, sometimes go
unrecognized in AI laws, particularly for same sex couples, wed and
unwed, as well as for single women. Upon a briefreview of contemporary
American state AI laws, current and future constitutional precedents are
explored. Constitutional, as well as public policy, reforms are particularly
needed for same-sex female couples and single women employing AI as
intended parents.
II. CONTEMPORARY Al PARENTAGE LAWS
The significant variations in contemporary childcare parentage Jaws
covering AI births are well illustrated by reviewing the Idaho Artificial
Insemination Act (AJA) and the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).

parenthood definitions . Sec gmeralh Jeffrey A. Parness & Matthew Timko. De Facto Parent and
No11pam1t Child S11pporr Orders, 67 AM . U. L. REV. 769, 797-800 (2018).

5.

The limited federal guidelines arc reYiewed in Jeffrey A. Parness, F~derol Cv11stit11tio11al

Childcare Pa, ents. 90 Sr. JOHN'S L REV 965(2016)
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Idaho laws, as well as some other state laws, 1' follow the 1973 UPA on Al
births, and arc quite limited, leaving open significant constitutional
questions. The 2017 UPA is more comprehensive, though it too prompts
some questions.

A. Idaho Artificial il1seminat ion A cl
In Idaho there are no statutes or precedents on parentage for children
born of surrogacy FEI or surrogacy Al. 7 Nonsurrogacy AI births are
addressed in statutes that contemplate parentage for the person giving
birth and her husband. 8 A 2021 Idaho Supreme Court decision, relying on
the U.S. Supreme Court marriage equality dictate for same sex couples,
deemed married lesbian couples were also governed by the statutes. 9
Under the Idaho statutes, "only" licensed physicians and "persons
under their supervision may select artificial insemination donors and
perform artificial insemination." 10 1l1e statutes cover only semen
introduction involving a donor, 11 defined as a man who is not "the
husband of the woman upon whom the artificial insemination is
performed." 12 Upon donor selection, Al "shall not be performed upon a
woman without her prior w1itten request and consent and the prior written
request and consent of her husband." 13 Where the physician performing
AI does not deliver a conceived child, "it is the duty of the mother and her
husband" to give "notice" to that physician of the child's birth. 14 A child's
AI birth following such Al establishes the same "relationship, rights, and
obligations" in the husband "as if the child had been naturally and
legitimately conceived by the mother and the mother's husband." 15 The
Idaho AI statutes apply to "all persons conceived as a result of artificial
6

See. e.g., ALA. CODE§ 26-l 7-704(a); MONT CODF. ANN § 40-6-106(1 ); TEX. FAM. CODE

§ I G0 .704(a); MINN STAT. § 257.56(1 ); COLO REV. STAT.§ 19--4-106( I); UTAH CODE ANN § 78815-704 .
7 Set', e.g. In re Doe, 372 P 3d 1106 (Idaho 2016) (no judicial au1ho1ity to declare paientage
of a child born to ges1ational ca1Tier in absence of statute); see also Doe v Doe, 395 P.Jd 1287 (Idaho
2017) (former unwed female pa11ne1 has no legally recognized interest in a child bom to her pa11ner
via Al)
R. IDAHO CODE§ 39-5403( I)
9. Gatsby v. Gatsby, 495 P 3d996, 1002-03 (Idaho 2021) (under Obergef~/1 v. Hodges, 576
U S 644(2015), which requires state 1ecogni1ions ofsa111e-sex 111a1Tiages, the Idaho Al statute applies
10 ·'opposite-sex and same-sex couples in 1he e.,acl same manner")
10 IDAIIO CODI:§ 39-5402 .
II
Id §39-5401(1)
12 . Id § 39-540 I (2)
13
Id § 39-5403( I)
14 Id.§ 39-54 03(2)
15 Id § 39-5405(3)

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4078968

128

CoN L,\\\'NO\V

fl 3: 125

insemination as defined" therein. 1r, It is a misdcmeanor 17 for any "person"
to violate the statutory provisions on physician-only AI; ix on requests,
consents and notices regarding Al birth: 19 and. on donors. 20
B. 2017 Uniform Parentage A ct
The 2017 UPA, implemented in some states, 21 is far different in its
approach to childcare parentage in Al births. It is also far more progressive
than its 1973 or 2000 UPA counterparts.
I. Nonsurrogacy AI Births
As for nonsurrogacy AI births, the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA) only recognizes a limited form of assisted reproduction, which
embodies an AI birth undertaken by a married, opposite sex couple who
employed "a licensed physician" and "semen donated by a man" other
than the husband. 22 The donor here is always "treated in law as if he were
not the natural father. " 23 The husband is only "treated in law as if he were
the natural father" if insemination occurred "under the supervision of a
licensed physician and with the consent" of the husband. 24 As noted, the
Idaho statute is comparable. 25
The 2000 UP A expands parentage opportunities for those involved
in births not arising from sex, speaking to "assisted reproduction" and not
just Al. 26 It authorizes parentage for sperm donors and for nondonor men
who consent to AI "with the intent to be the parent. " 27 Such men are
16. Id. § 39-5406 (except forjudicial decrees c11te1cd before the effective date of the Al statutes,
which were first enacted in 1982).
17. Id. § 39-5407.
18. Id. § 39-5402.
19. Id. § 39-5403 .
20. Id. § 39-5404 .
21. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS §15-8-101 ; WASH. REV. CODE 26.26A.005. Whe1e chiefly
implemented, the 2017 UPA is not always strictly followed See, e g., R.J. GEN. LAWS§ 15-8. 1-10 I
to 15-8. 1-1004 (110 paternity registry p1ovisio11); WA SH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.005-26.26A .904 (no
paternity regist1y provision).
22. UNIFORM PATERNITY ACT§ 5(a) (1973) ("1973 UPA"').
23. Id § S(b ).
24 Id. § 5(a).
25. IDAHO CODE§ 39-5402 (physicians and persons under their supe1visio11); Id. §39-5403( I)
(husband and wife must request and consent).
26. The 2000 UPA defines assisted rep1oducli on as involving "pregnancy" other than by sexual
intercourse, including pregnancy by intrauterine insemination. donation ofeggs, donati on ofemb1yos,
JVF and tran sfer of emb1yos, and intracyloplasmic spc1m injection. UNIFORM PAT ERNITY ACT §
I 02(4) (2000) ("2000 UP A").
27. 2000 UPA~ 703-704 (consent "must be in a record" and signed by the man and the woman
to receive Al)
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expecting legal parents whose parent;igc arises when children arc born. 28
The ''husband" of a "wife" who gives birth via AI has limited
opportunities to "challenge his palernity." 29 The 2000 UPA is generally
fol lowed in some states, 30 though some of its proposed laws are subject to
significant challenges. 31
The 20 l 7 UPA further expands parentage opportunities in
nonsurrogacy AI settings. 1lrnt act is "substantially similar'' to the 2000
UPA, but is updated to apply "equally to same-sex couples. " 32 Thus, an
"i ndi vi dual" who consents to "assisted reproduction by a woman, with the
intent to be a parent of a child conceived by the assisted reproduction," is
a parent of the child. 33 With a nonsurrogacy AI birth having no such
consenting individual, the spouse of the person giving birth has limited
opportunities to challenge the spouse's parentage. 34
For there to be two legal parents at birth fora nonsurrogacy AI child,
the 2017 UPA requires that the consent to parentage be signed "in a
record" by the person giving birth and "an individual who intends to be a
parent," though the "record" need not be certified by a physician. 35
Seemingly, "consent in a record" can be undertaken "before, on, or after
birth of the child. " 36 A lack of such consent does not foreclose, however,
childcare parentage for an intended parent where there is clear-andconvincing evidence of an "express agreement" between the individual
and the person giving birth "entered before conception." 37 As well, a lack
28 Id, § 703 ("a parent oflhe resulting child'")
29 Id. § 705. One opportunity involves a lack of consent, "before or afler birth of the child,"
shown in a proceeding brought "within two years atier learning of !he binh." Id. § 705(a) . Another
oppo11u11i1y involves a challenge at any time where there was either 110 spe1111 donation or no consent;
110 cohabitation "since the probable Lime of assisted reproduction:·· and no open hold out of the child
as one's own. Id. 705(b).
30 See. e g . 13 DF.l Com' § 8-703(a): Wvo STAT ANN § 14-2-903
31. See. e.g. Douglas NeJaime, The Nature a/ Parenthnnd. 126 YALE LAW J. 2260 (2017)(with
useful charts and citations 011 American state assisted reproduction laws)
32 2017 UPA, Ar1. 7, c111L
33. 2017 UP A~ 703(a)
34. Id§ 705(a) (spouse '"al the1i111e ofthc child's bi11h'")
35 . Id.§ 704(a) Co111pare CAL. FAM CODI'§ 7613(a)(IJ ("consent shall be in w,iting") and§
76 I 3(a)(2) (intended parent br preconception "oral agreement·• is shown by clear and convincing
evidence)
36 2017UPA*704(b)
37 . Id 704(b)(I) It may be sensible that an '"express agreement"' unde11aken postcunceplion
does not prompt rn111pa1ablc childca,c parc111agc 1-lc,c. rhe,c is much grcate, cc11ainty that a child
will be bom so that an agreement is for less spccula1ivc_ Perhars instead or a pos1conception but
prebi11h ag1ee111en1. the 2017 UP A conlernplatccJ a pos1conccption but prcbi11h VAP. ,L, it ,ccognizes
an ··intcnclcd pa,cnt" can sign a VAP Yet. an '"in1c11cJcd parent"' in many states has 110 p1cbi11h YAP
access where there is followed the 1973 UPAor2000 UPA which only authorize postbi11h (patemity)
VAi's 1973 Ul'A ~ 4(b) C"irntc111i1y'· acknlllvlcdgmc111 '"uf lhc child'. in a .. writing filed with., ihc

*

*
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of consent in a record and a lack of an express agreement does not
foreclose an individual's parentage where the child was held out as the
individual's own in the child's first two years. 38 The nonparental status of
one married to a person giving birth to a nonsurrogacy Al child, even if a
gamete donor, may be established by a showing of a Jack of consent, a
lack of any agreement, or a Jack of any holding out of the child as one's
own. 39
As noted, the nonsurrogacy Al parentage norms in each of the UPAs
are now reflected in state statutes. 4 Further, there arc state common law
precedents untethered to statutes that are similar to the UPA provisions. 41
There are significant interstate variations. 42
So, childcare parentage for those giving birth and for intended
parents in nonsurrogacy AI settings can arise from express consents.
There could be, but there generally are no, state forms guiding, if not
mandating, usage. In California in nonsurrogacy Al settings, there are
statutorily-recommended consent forms that may be used, but are not
required. 43

°

state, which is not disputed by "the mother"); 2000 UPA § 30 I ("man claiming lo be the genetic father
of the child"signs together with the "mother ofa child").
3 8. 2017 UP A § 704(b )(2).
39 Id. § 705.
40. American state statutes include: TEX. FAM. CODE§ 160.7031 (fatherhood for unwed man,
intending to be father, who provides spenn to licensed physician and consents to the use of that spe1m
for assisted reproduction by an unwed woman, where consent is in a record signed by man and woman
and kept by the physician); N.H. REV . STAT. § 5-C:30(1)(b) (unwed mother has spenn donor
"identified on bi1th record" where "an atlidavit of paternity" has been executed); 13 DEL. CODE§ 8704(a) ("Consent by a woman and a man who intends to be a parent of a child born to the woman by
assisted reproduction must be in a record signed by the woman and the man"); WYO . STAT. § 14-2904(a) (like Delaware); N.M. STAT. ANN . ~ 40-l lA-703 ("A person who provides eggs, sperm, or
emb1yos for or consents to assisted reproduction as provided in Section 704 ("record signed .. before
the placement"] ... with the intent to be the parent ofa child is a parent oflhe resulting child").
41. Precedents include: Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29 (Or. App 2009) (to avoid
constitutional inti1111ity, assisted reproduction statute as w1itten solely for nrnnied opposite sex couple
applied to same sex domestic pmtners); Jason P v Danielle S , 171 Cal. Rpt1 3d 789 (Cal. App 2d
2014)(though lhestalule(bothpre-2011 and post-201 l)indica\ed explicitly a lackofpalernityfo1 this
pmtictdm semen donor when his unwed pm1ner delivered a child conceived via assisted reproduction,
the statute on presumed pmentage for one (either male or female) who receives a child into the home
and openly holds oul \he child as one's own na\ural child can support-in certain circumslances-legal
paternity for the semen donor); Ramey v . Sutton, 362 P .3d 217 (Ok . 2015) (unwritten preconception
agreement prompts in loco paientis childcare status for fonner lesbian pmtne1 of birth mother, though
she contributed no genetic material); In re Brooke S.B . v. Elizubeth A C.C. 61 NE . 3d 488 (N .Y.
2016) (agreement between lesbian partners can p1ompl parentage in non-binh mother)
42. The nonsu1rngacy Al laws are reviewed and critiqued. in Deborah H. Fonnan, E.,ploring
the Bo1111da1 ies of Families Created with Kno,rn Sperm Donors Who's In and Who:, Ou(). 19 PFNN
J. L. & Soc. CHANGE 41 (2016).
43 . CAL. FAM. CODE§ 7613.5(d) (fonns on assisted reproduction pacts by two ma1Tied or by
two unman-icd people. where signatories may 01 may not have used 1heir own genetic material lo
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As noted, the 2017 UPA recognizes nonsurrogacy Al parentage
where there is no consent "in a record" if there is either an express
agreement on intended parenthood or there is actual residency/hold out
parental-like conduct in the child's first two years. 44 Perhaps as well, one
can attain nonsurrogacy AI parenthood by establishing de facto parentage,
which requires no residency with the child in the child's first two years.~ 5
2. Surrogacy Al Births
As for surrogacy AI births, the 1973 UP A only speaks to AI
involving a wife, her nondonor husband, and a semen donor who is treated
"as if he were not the natural father." 46 A comment declares the act "does
not deal with many complex, and serious legal problems raised by the
practice of artificial insemination. " 4 7
The 2000 UPA, by contrast, has separate articles on children of
assisted reproduction and children of gestational agreements. 48 The
article on assisted reproduction does not apply to a birth "as the result of
a gestational agreement. " 49 Such an agreement, "whether in a record or
not, that is not judicially validated is not enforceable." 50 Births arising
from nonvalidated gestational agreements are governed by the article on
the "parent-child relationship," which deems the woman giving birth to
be the legal parent, together with a man (i.e., "father") who was married
to the birth mother at the time of birth, who signed a V AP, who consented
to AI, or who was adjudicated a parent in a paternity suit (i.e., has genetic
ties). 51

prompt a pregnancy). See also JetTrey A. Patness, Formal Declaralio11s of l11/e11ded Childcare
Pare111age, 92 NOTRE DAME L REV ONLINE SUPP. 87 (Mar. 30, 2017) (urging more states to create
such ro,ms)
44 2017 UPA§ 704(b)
45. Id ~ 609 (only one claiming de facto paientage can seek establishment) See Jetlicy A.
Pa,ness, Comparable Pursuils of Hald 0111 and De Facio Parenlage: T11 eaking !he 2017 Uniform
Parenlage Act, 31 J. ACAD . MATR LAWS 157, 169-73 (2018) (urging broader standing for those who
seek de facto parentage). Under the 20 I 7 UP A, de facto parentage is only unavai Iable in a proceeding
"10 adjudicate the paientage of a child born under a surrogacy agreement " 2017 UPA § 60 I (b).
46. 1973UPA§5
47
1973 UPA, crnt. at 5 (indicates "h111her consideration ofothe, aspects" of Al was urged,
citing Walter Wadlington, Arli/icial /11se111i11mio11 The Danger of a Poorly Kepi Secrel, 64 Nw . UNIV.
L REV 777, 793-97, 807 (1970) (u1gings1a1e Jaws on Al afle1 1eviewing some early statutes staiting
in the 111id-l%Os))
48 . 2000 UPA. A,1 7 (Child ot' Assisted Reproduction) & 8 (Gestational Agreement)
49 21JOIJUPA~7UI
50 2000 UP A~ 809(a).
51 . 2000 Ul'A § 809(b) (relerencing § 201 ).
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The 2017 UPA similarly has separate articles on assisted
reproduction and surrogacy agreements. 52 But it also has special parts for
gestational surrogacy agreements and agenetic surrogacy agreements. 53
For each type of surrogacy agreement, pregnancy results from "assisted
reproduction. " 54 AI is employed only with "genetic" surrogacy, where a
woman, who "is not an intended parent," agrees to "become pregnant"
through AI while "using her own gamete" pursuant to an "agreement as
provided" in the Act. 55 A genetic surrogacy agreement must, inter al ia,
conform to el igibi I ity norms for any surrogate and any intended parents
(who need not be "genetically related"); 56 be in "a record;" 57 be
undertaken with "independent legal representation; 58 be "executed before
a medical procedure occurs related to the agreement, other than "medical
evaluation and mental health consultation;" 59 and, usually be "validated"
by a court before any AI related to the agreement. 60 A genetic surrogacy
agreement can be terminated by an intended parent by notice "any time
before a gamete or embryo transfer." 61 Such an agreement can be
terminated by the genetic surrogate "any time before 72 hours" after the
AI birth. 62 An unvalidated genetic surrogacy agreemen~ where there is no
withdrawal of consent within 72 hours of birth, does not necessarily lead
to parentage under law in the woman giving birth. 63

52 . 2017 UPA ~§ 701 cl seq. (Assisted Reproduction) & 801 et seq. (Surrogacy Agreement).
53 2017 UP A§§ 813-18 (genetic su1rngacy), §§ 808-12 (gestational sunngacy).
54 . 2017 UP A § 804(a)( I).
55 2017 UP A § 80 I (I). Gestational su1rngacy, by contrast, has the woman giving bi11h
achieving pregnancy through "gametes that are not her own" (FEI) . 2017 UPA § 80 I (2)
56. 2017 Ul' A§ 802(a) & (b).
57 2017UPA§803(4).
58. 2017 UPA § 803(7).
59 2017 UP A § 803(9).
60 . 2017 UP/\ § 813(a) . Exceptions include settings where "all patties agree" that cou11
validation could occur alter Al, but before bi11h . 20 I 7 UPA
8 l 6(b). Where the genetic su1rngate
withd1aws consent to an unvalidated agreement within 72 hours of bi11h, parentage is adjudicated,
with possible approaches including bi11h mother parentage, spousal parentage, residency/hold out
parentage, YAP parentage, and de facto parentage. 2017 UPA § 816(c) (referencing Anicles 1-6 of
2017 UPA) Where the,e is no validated agreement and no such withdrawal, an adjudication of
parentage depends upon assessments of the best interests of the child (with 1elevant factors in 2017
Ul' A ~ 6 l 3(a)) and "the intent of the pai1ies ." 2017 UPA 8 l 6(d).
Preinsemination cou11 orders validating genetic sunugacy pacts differ fi·om preinsemination and
postinscrninatiun but prcbi11h cou11 orders declaring legal parentage of later born child1en. See, e.g,
Steven l·l. Snyder & Ma1y Patricia Byrn. The Use of Prehirlh Parentage Orders in S,irrngac)'
Pwceedings. 39 FAM . L Q 633 (2005) (reviewing availability of such orders in several states) ,
61. 2017 UPA~ 814(a)(I) .
62 . 2017 UP/\~ 814(a)(2).
63
2017 UPA ~ 816(d),

*

*
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Ill.CONSTITUTIONAL ISSU[S IN PARr:NT1\G[ FOR

Al BIRTHS

American state statutes and judicial precedents chiefly govern
childcare parentage, that is, parent status under law for child custody,
visitation, and/or parental responsibility allocation purposes. r,~ Of course,
these laws cannot infringe upon individual federal or state constitutional
interests, including rights tied to due process, equal protection, and
privacy. 65 One such infringing statute is the Idaho Artificial Insemination
Act. When this act was challenged, the Idaho high court found only
limited constitutional infringcment. 66 But the act is far more problematic
than was indicated. The court ruling, once reviewed, will be used to
illustrate the span of constitutional issues arising under Al statutes,
including laws grounded on the varying UP As.

A. Reading the Idaho A rtiflcial fnseminntion A ct
In Gatsby v. Gatsby, two women, Linsay and Kylee, were married in
June 2015. 67 Deciding to have a child through the artificial insemination
of Kylee "using semen donated by a mutual friend,"the women proceeded
"without using the services of a physician" and "without consulting an
attorney. " 68 The couple did sign with the friend "an artificial insemination
agreement Linsay found on line, listing the friend as 'donor' and both
Linsay and Kylee as the 'recipient'. " 69 The pact said the donor "would not
have parental rights or obligations to the child. " 70
64 . Legal parentage is contextual so that it can vaiy between different settings
Nonconstitutional, nonstatutory common law precedents and statutes can significantly differ in
childcare, tort and probate. See, e.g, .letli-ey A. Parness, WJ,u Is A Pare111~ !111rnslalea11d lfliers wte
Differences, 34 J. AM ACAD MAT. LAWS. _ (fo11hcorning 2022).
65. State constitutions can go further in guaranteeing equal protection. See. e g, ILL. CONS1
ail . 1, § 18 (no unequal protection by state or its units of local government and school dist1icls due lo
"sex"); TEX. CONST. ai1. I,§ 3a("selt:operative·· amendment declaring no denial of equality "because
of race, color, creed, or national origin"); KAN. CONST. art . 15 , ~ 6 (women have "equal rights in th e
possession of their children"). While the federal constitution has no exp! icit recognition of indi vidual
privacy interests, some slate constitutions do; thus. constitutional privacy interes ts beyond those
arising under due process and equal prot ection cnn lim it state Al parentage laws See, e.g , CAL
CONST art. I, § I ("All people ,
have
inalienable 1ights" which include "happiness·· and
"privacy"); WASH . CONST. ar1 . I,§ 7 ("No person shall be distu1bed in his privat e alfairs . without
authority of law"), Time also may be other possible constitutional interests in Al parentage laws, I ike
the right to travel for intended par·enls (cg , for those seeking sunogacy parenthood unavailable at
home) and the right of guaranteeing children to know about. if not have relationships with , those with
whom they have genetic tics (not unlike infonna1ional intc1cs1 s for children fo1mally adopted))
66. Gatsby v. Gatsby, 495 P .3d 996 , I 002-03 (Idaho 2021)
67 Id. at 999
68 Id.
69. Id.
70 Id
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Linsay performed the insemination in the couple's home. 71 Kylee
gave birth on October 29, 2016. 72 The birth certificate listed both Linsay
and Kylee as "mother. " 73 The child lived with the women ''who held
themselves out as the child's parents" unti I the Summer of 20 I 7 when the
women physically fought, leading to a domestic battery conviction for
Kylee and a .July 2017 no contact order "which prohibited Kylee from
seeing her child except at daycare." 74 Linsay filed for divorce in August
2017 , whereupon Kylee asserted Linsay had no legal claim or standing to
any custody or visitation. 75
Linsay had sole custody of the child from .July 3 to December 27,
2017, at which time an order of "equal custody" was entered. 76 Custody
was shared until November 2018, when a magistrate court granted Kylee
"sole custody," upon finding that "Linsay was not the child's legal parent"
and that Linsay "had established no third-party rights." It also found that
it was not in the child's best interests for Linsay to have any custody or
visitation . 77
While Linsay was deemed a presumptive spousal parent due to her
marriage to Kylee at the time of birth, the magistrate found the
presumption overcome by the fact that Linsay "is not [ the child's]
biological parent. " 78 The magistrate found Linsay could have attained
legal parenthood via "a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity
affidavit" (V AP), but did not do so. 79 The magistrate also found Linsay
did not adopt the child and "did not comply with the Artificial
Insemination Act (AJA). " 80 Upon affinnance by a district court, an appeal
went to the Idaho Supreme Court.
The high court did not address whether Linsay could have completed
a V AP. 81 Yet it strongly hinted that such a V AP was unavai Iable to Linsay

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. al 999-1000. The child was not identified "due Lo privacy concerns." Id. al 999 n. 1.
75, Id. at l 000
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (IDA IIO Cool:~ 7-1106 ( I) within Paternity Act). VAPs Lhut are luler di scussed herein
encompass all limns of voluntmy parentage acknowledgements, however denominated und whoever
rnuy be explicitly recognized as YAP signatories., including those without alleged 01 actual biological
ties, us with Lin say See, e.g, 15 VT. STAT . § 310 (2019) (signing of an "acknowledgement of
parentage" by the person who gave birth and "un intended parent").
80. Gatsby, 495 P.3d at I 000.
8 l. Id. at l 007.
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for the A I A was "controlling" due lo the use of A I. 82 Fu rt her, the Idaho
"common law marital presumption of paternity" was deemed inapplicable
because the Al A controlled, s 3 not because the presumption only applied
to men. The court did not address the issue of Linsay's "third-party
standing" under law for nonparental childcare. 84 The court did affom the
conclusion on ''the child's best interest for Kylee to be awarded sole
custody,"~ 5 perhaps making its legal conclusions on the AIA merely
dicta . 36 The court also affirmed the "holding that Linsay could not obtain
parental rights ... under the AJA because she did not comply with all the
requirements of the law. " 87 Finally, the court agreed that Linsay could
have avoided the case outcome by adopting the child, xx recognizing at
least one exception to the control ling status of the AIA.

B. Co11trolli11g/Exclusive Al Statutes
Reading AI statutes generally to be the controlling/exclusive avenues
to parent status for intended parents who do not give birth, as the Gatsby
court did with the Idaho AIA, leaves many prospective parents with only
the options of a formal adoption (a costly venture) or a nonparentaI
childcare order (a costly venture even when available). Prospective
parents were also not afforded much insight by the high court on what
would have constituted "prior written request and consent" by Kylee and
82. Id. al 1002 (AJA "is controlling" as it is a "more specific statute" than lhe Pa1e111ity Acl,
IDAHO CODF. § 7-1101 el seq, which contains lhe YAP 1101ms, al§§ 7-1106 & 1007)
83. Id. at 1002 . Co111pare McLaughlin v Jones, 401 P 3d 492. 501-02 (Ariz, 2017) (same sex
female spouse can equilably eslop a bi1th mothe1 's at1e111pt to ovell'ide a spousal paientage
p1esu111rtion) ,.-iii, Dohe11y v. Leon, 472 P.Jd 531, 538-39 (Ariz /\pp 2020) (spe11n donor equitably
estopped from seeking parentage of Al child bom 10 a rnall'ied female couple).
84. Ga1sby, 495 P 3d al 1010 ("any e1Tor in the . . third party standing analysis was cured
because the magistrale coun neve11heless addressed whether giving Linsay custody 1igh1s would be
in the child's best interest") Third pmty standing had been sought under Stockwell v. Stockwell, 775
P 2d 611 , 613 (Idaho 1989) (common law guidelines 011 a nonpaic11t (there a steppa1ent) ove1co111ing
a natural pa1ent's custodial 1ights). Gutsby, 495 P 3d at IO IO On third pmty statuto1y standing of a
nonparcnl Lo seek child visitalion. see, e.g., IDAHO CODI' ~ 32-1703 ("de laclo custodian'' who must
be "rclatei.l to a child within the 1hi1d degree of consanguinity"): IDAHO CODe ~ 32-717(3)
(g1andparents); IDAHO CODF. § 32-719 (grandparenls and gri:-Jt grandpa1cnt s): ID AHO CODE§ 15-5204 (gua1dians hip proceeding)
85 Gatshv. 495 l'.3d at 1007.
86 S ei!. I! g, S111i1h , . Angell, 830 r 2d 1163, 1173 (Idaho 1992) (Bistline, J , concu,,-ing )
(obiter dictum and dirnun involve cou11 pronouncements not essential Lo the coun 's de1em1ination);
see als o C ity of'Wci ppc v. Yarno. 528 I' 21120 I. 205 (Idaho 1974) (high coun is not bound by i Is own
eailier dic1a)
87 Ga11·h, ·. 495 r 3d at I 004. The AIA bar to Lins;iy. the na1u1'JI moth er's spouse, was
foreshadowed in Doe,._ Du,-, 395 1'.3d 1287, 1291 (Idaho 2017) (/\I/\ ba1 applied to natural mother's
fo1111er fe111al e panner)
88 Garsbv. 49 5 I' 3d JI I 007
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Linsay. Further, Idaho legislators arguably did not contemplate Al do-ityourselfcrs since the AJA limited AI perfonrnmcc to licensed
"physicians" and "persons under their supervision." 89 As well, intended
parents were teased with the potential for nonparental childcare standing,
though relevant statutes and precedents seem unaccommodating to the
likes of Linsay. 90
Surely controlling/exclusive statutes could address the norms for all
who undertake Al. But where statutes do not, they should reference other
possible avenues to parenthood in AI births for those not included, like a
husband who intends to parent a child born of AI to his wife with the use
of his semen. 91 The Idaho AIA spoke specifically only to married couples
who employed "physicians." The "controlling" nature of this statute, as
read in Gatsby, presents difficulties for do-it-yourselfers, as well as for
both unmarried couples and single women pursuing AI parentage,
whether or not physicians are used.
To avoid constitutional issues
(i.e., infringements on
procreational/privacy rights) arising from incomplete AI statutes deemed
controlling/exclusive, courts should shun these designations. 92 In Idaho,
the AIA says its provisions "apply to all persons conceived as a result of
artificial insemination as defined herein." The child of Kylee and Linsay
arguably was not such a person as no physician was used and thus the
child was outside of the conduct explicitly addressed in the AIA. The AIA
should not have covered the actions of Kylee and Linsay because it was
controlling. Such a reading makes Linsay's possible use of a marital
spousal parent presumption or a voluntary parentage acknowledgment
much easier. 93

89. ]DAI-JO CODE§ 39-5402 .
90 See supra note 85 (citing Idaho statutes) As to precedent, see, cg., /11 re E,ving, 529 P.2d
1296, 1298 (Idaho 1974) (nonparent must have had custody "for an appreciable pe1iod of time (in
excess of three years)" as well as show "best interests of the child").
91. Under the Garsby ruling. such a husband may not be a parent and may have to undc11ake a
fo1mal adoption to secure childcare pmentage (as spousal parentage may only apply lo nonAl bi11hs
since Al bi11hs are exclusively guided by the "controlling" AJA)
92
Even when Al statutes deemed "exclusive" omit ce11ain intended patents, coul1s have
employed the "equitable-pm·ent" doctrine to find parenthood. See, e.g., Pueblo v. Haas, 2021 WL
6130700 (Mich App. 2021 )(doctrine I imitcd to Al bi11hs to mmTied couples) Similar decisions with
no judicial deference lo legislatures on maller involving significant social p1oblems arc lound when
there is a complete absence of statutes . See, e.g, In 1c Paternity off T.R. 833 N.W. 2d 634, 653
(Wis. 2013) (enfo1cing, via common law precedent, a sun-ogacy Al pacl, while obse1ving "sunogacy
is cu1Tently a 1eality").
93
There was no mention in Gatsby of any Gene1al Assembly dcsi1e to block VAPs for
intended female patents in AI bi11hs .
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The 2017 UPA provisions on Al births reject controlling/exclusive
status as it expressly recognizes parentage can arise from Al births outside
the proposed statutory Al guidelines on consent "in a record. " 9 ~ The 20 I 7
UPA declares that without a "record" consent, "before, on, or after the
birth of the child," an "individual" can become a parent to an Al child if
( 1) the individual bad a preconception "express agreement" that the
individual and prospective birth mother "intended they both would be
parents, " 95 or (2) "for the first two years of the child's I ifc," the individual
and birth mother "resided together in the same household with the child
and openly held out the child as the individual's child." 96 I 11 Cali fomia, an
exception to the requirement of a "writing" is found in the AI statute,
under which an "intended parent" and an AI b_irth mother are both parents
if there is "clear and convincing evidence that, prior to the conception ...
the woman and the intended parent had an oral agreement that the woman
and the intended parent would both be parents of the child." 97 Without
explicit statutory alternatives to the consent requirement in the Idaho AIA,
judicial precedents are warranted in order to respect parental intentions
and to promote a child's best interests. Such precedents are also necessaiy
to meet constitutional demands.

C. Limiting Al Intended Parents
Statutes on childcare parentage arising from AI births often limit
standing to seek parentage. The Idaho AIA expressly speaks only of
preconception consent by a "woman" and "her husband," 98 though the
Gatsby court deemed the act also applicable to a woman and her female
spouse given the federal constitutional demands of equality for same-sex
and opposite-sex married couples. 99 By contrast, as noted the 201 7 UPA
94 . 2017 UP A§ 704(a).
95 . 2017 UPA ~ 704(b)( I) (need "clear-and-convincing evidence;" either the bi11h mother
(presumably often for child suppo11 purpose) 01 the individual can seek to prove such an agreement)
96 . 2017 UPA ~704(b)(2), which derives from 2017 UP/\§ 204 (a)(2) (outside the ai1icle on
assisted 1·cproduc1ion). The Al bi11h mother is a legal parent by giving bi11h. 2017 UPA § 201(1)
(which excepts "genetic" and "gestational'" surrogates, under J\J1icle 8 of the UP A, pai1icularly at
80 I (I) and 80 I (2)) No explanation is given in Gatsh1• as lo why Kylee's parentage was not controlled
by the AJA . Such control seems contra1y to U S Supreme Coull precedent on the constitutional
childcare interests of those giving bi11h See, e.g, Tuan Anh Nguyen v . INS., 533 U.S 53, 60,62
(200 I) (bir1h mothers do not have same requi1e111cnts as biological fathers in claiming U S citizenship
for thci,· children because lor bi11h mothers '"real, c,·e1yday ties"' during pregnancy arc suOicient to
prompt protected child1earing inte1csts)
97 . CAL . FAM COl"JF ~ 7Gl3(a)(2)
98

lDAIIO CODE~ 39-5403 (110 pedonnance of Al (by a physician) without p1ior "request and

consent',)

99.

Gutsln. 495 I' 3d al I 002-03
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speaks or "consent" 111 a record by "an individual" and a "woman giving
birth." 11111 l n a California Al birth employing a non parent semen donor, the
woman and "another i ntcndcd parent" can "consent" to dual parentage. 1111
The 2017 UPA and California approaches arc preferable. They arc
also constitutionally compelled in some instances. 102 The U.S. Supreme
Court has declared: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 103 Where the state seeks
to foreclose a certain form of AI parentage altogether, the infringements
on procreation desires must be supported by legitimate ( if not compel ling)
governmental interests.
Constitutional requirements on the need for legitimate state intere:-,is
has both fundamental rights and equality elements. While the U.S.
Supreme Court has been urged to extend substantive "liberty" interests in
childcare to many intended nonbiological parents, 104 in the near future
such recognitions seem unlikely. 105 Yet those similarly situated must also
be treated equally in AI laws, with distinctions between individuals and

I 00

2017 UP A § 704(a) & (b) (noting that failure to "consent in a record . .• before. on, or alkr

bi1th" docs not preclude J\I parentage due to a preconception "express
residency/hold out parentage acts in the "first two years of the child's life").

agreement"

m

to

I 111 . CAL FAM CODE ~ 76 I 3(a)(l )&(2). See also CAL FAM. CODE ~ 76] 3(b)(2) & (3)
(recognizing intcnded pa1cntage in women and men (who may 01· may not have provided spenn)
whc1c "a licensed physician or surgeon or a licensed spenn bank" is not employed).
I 02 . It also may be that p10c1eation inle1esls J'or some people intending to use their spenn in Al
settings c::111 be limited by the state. Consider, e.g., theldaho AlA which bars semen donations by any
person who has "any disease or uctect known by him to be transmissible by genes" o r who "knows
01·has reason to know he has a venereal uisease." lDAIIO CODE~ 39-5404. Where a donor is pursuing
parrnthood via/\!, similar stale limits do exist. See. e.g., 52 OR. REV. STAT. S 677 370 (semen may
not be donated fo r use in Al by any person who has a disease transmissible by genes or who knows
or Im, 1·e,1,1Jn lo know he li.L, a sexually transmilled infection); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN §
23 I IJ/23 I 0-325(b) (Class J\ misdemeanor to knowingly use semen of an J\I donor "who has tested
positive for exposu1e to HIV").
103 , Eisenstadt v. 13ai1'tl. 405 U. S . 438, 453 (1972) (eontrnceplion access case with no majo1·i1y
opinion) . The Eise11st11d1 declaration has since been deemed, with other precedents like Roe 1•. Wade.
410 U .S J 13 ( 1983). lo teach "that the Constitution p1olects indiviuual uecisions in mailers or
child1·earing Ii-om unjustilied intrusions by the St,1le." Carey v . Population Services lnlernalional.
431 lJ s. 678. 687 ( 1987)
I 04. Sec. ,·.•~ .. Ne.Jaime, supra note 31, at 2357-59 (how "cou1ts might extenu due process

protection lo srn:ial bonds in the absence of biological connection"); DOl1glas NcJaime, The
Co11sti1111io11 of T'a,enthood. 72 S'l/\Nf"OIUJ L. REV . 261. 376-79 (2020) (the consequences. and
di llicul ties in . applying a 1erngnized "I ibe11y interest lor those who J'onn non-biological parent-chi Id
brn1ds'"J
105 . Parness. Fede, al C/1ildrn1 e T'arents, s11µra note 5, at 978-95 (desc1ibing, and crilieizing.
US Supreme Cou11 detcm1I to state lawmaking on defining paients who possess superior tcdernl
cons1i1u1ional ehildca1c 1·ighls)
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couples, or between wed and unwed couples, being, at least, rational.
Where distinctions arc suspect because of their focus on immutable
characteristics or discrete groups, their justifications must be more
significant. 106
As to equality, the Gatsby court held Lhe U.S. Supreme Court sarnesex marriage ruling in Obergefe11 v. Hodges mandated that same sex
married couples should have equal access to dual parentage via AI births
under the AIA as had by opposite sex married couples. 107 Do equality
principles not also demand that a single woman can secure parentage via
a nonsurrogacy AI birth facilitated by a sperm donor who waived any
parental interests? And do equality principles not also demand that a
married or unmarried opposite sex couple can secure dual parentage via
an AI birth which did not involve the sperm donor's waiver of parental
interests? The 2017 UPA, encompassing such possible single or dual
parentage, 108 recognizes the need for equality.
As well, certain parentage recognitions beyond the Idaho AIA seem
constitutionally mandated by substantive due process, as with the single
intended parent giving birth or with a sperm provider who intends
parentage via surrogacy or nonsurrogacy AI. The U.S. Supreme Com1 has
generally recognized that parental childcare interests arise automatically
for a birth mother whose child was conceived through sex. 109 Why not
similar parentage for a nonsurrogate employing AI? As to sperm
providers, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the biological father,
in a birth involving consensual sex, has a constitutionally-protected
interest in developing a parent-child relationship with his offspring,
except when the child is born into an intact marriage (under Obergefell,
either same sex or opposite). 110 That exception does not even apply in
states whose separate constitutional privacy interests extend beyond the
interests protected by federal due process. 111 With or without the
exception, should not sperm providers in AI settings with unwed
birthgivers be treated like sperm providers in consensual sex settings,
I 06 See, e.g . Jessica A. Clarke, AgaiJ1SI !1111nu1ability, 125 YALE L J . 2, 14-16(2015)
I 07 Gatsh1·. 495 P 3d al I 002-03 .
I 08 2017 UPA § 703 (an "individual" consents to Al, with a woman, to be a parent of a child'')
I 09. Nguw11. 533 U.S at 60
I I 0. Lehr· v. Robenson, 463 U.S . 248, 262 ( 1983) (an unwed biological father of a chi Id born of
consensual sex has a parental oppo11uni1y interest which is grasped by fanning a "significanl
custodial. personal, 01 financial relationship'' with his oflspring) l l1ough the i111eres1 in L<!h1 is
perhaps limited lo children born lo women 111a1Ticd to others as in Michael 1-l v Gemld D. 491 U.S
110. 128.132 ( 1989) (lour Justices)
111
See. e g, Callende1 v Skiles. 591 N. W.2d 182, 190-91 (Iowa 1999) (unwed b1olog1cal
father 01· cl1ild born of sex to a woman ma1Tied to ,mother has a libe11y interest in challenging the
husband's pa1e111i1y , a view rejected in Michael fl, 491 US al 128)
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especially because only in the former setting is evidence of intended
parentage usually required.
The limits on Al intended parents in the Idaho AJA and in sirnilrn·
statutes should be removed. If there is no removal by legislators, then
removal by courts is appropriate as there is no deference clue
unconstitutional legislation .

D. Limiting Parental Interest Waivers
In AI birth settings, there can be: a sperm donor who waived any
parental childcare interest before insemination; a sperm donor who
waived any parental childcare interests after insemination but before birth;
a sperm donor who waived any parental childcare interests only after
birth; a sperm donor who, prior to insemination, intended to be a childcare
parent, but who shed that desire after insemination, duiing the pregnancy,
or after birth; and, a sperm donor who earlier waived any parental
childcare interests, but who later, prcinsemination, postinsemination, or
postbirth, sought to be a parent under law. What, if anything, do federal
and state constitutions have to say about parental interest waivers and their
retractions?
Unfortunately, direct constitutional precedents are rare. Some
rulings, though, arc pertinent to AI sperm donors. In Lehr v. Robertson,
the U.S. Supreme Court did recognize that those with male genetic ties to
children, born of consensual sex, do have potential parental interests
which no other men possess. 112 In an adoption case setting, such interests
were deemed waived by a man who failed to timely establish a
"significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship" with his
offspring. 113 The timely establishment norms basically have been left to
the states as long as they are within federal due process constraints.
Waivers can include a parental opportunity loss arising from a failure to
follow statutory guidelines, as with a paternity registration, even where
those guidelines, and the pregnancy and birth, were not actually known to
the genetic father. 114 Precedent thus suggests that unintentional parental
interest waivers can be sustained. In Michael. H. v. Gerald D., the U.S.
Supreme Court did not mandate that states recognize this parental
opportunity interest in an unwed genetic father whose sex with a woman

I 12 I. <!hr. 463 U S al 2(,2
113. Id.
114 Id at 251 n 5 (citing N.Y. DoM . REL . L.~ I I 1-a(2)(C), which embodies N. Y. Soc Srnv
L ~ 372-c ("putative ra1hc1 1·cgis11y"))
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married Lo another prompted a bi11h into an intact family of two who have
raised, and wish to continue to raise, the child. 115
A sperm donor via Al should be treated comparably under state law,
given Lehr, to genetic father of a child born of consensual sex to an unwed
mother. Thus, his future parental intentions and pregnancy support,
particularly accompanied by the comparable, one-time intentions of the
woman later giving birth, should be respected.
Any recognition of a "record" consent to intended parentage arising
from an Al birth , as well as a sperm donor's waiver of parental interests,
could be limit ed to preconception settings. Postconception but prebirth
parental intentions and parental interest waivers can be addressed in VAPs
(though not where acknowledging parents are limited by law to gamete
donors). Postbirth parental intentions and parental interest waivers in Al
births can be accommodated by VAPs, by formal adoptions, and by
residency/hold out and de facto parentage (where gametes donations are
not required).
The Idaho AIA on semen donors requires preinseminationdonations
and waivers by men who are not the husbands of the women upon whom
Al is performed, 116 as well as preinsemination written requests and
consents by the husbands of such women. 117 Upon such donations and
consents, no statutory provision in Idaho allows donors to retract their
parental interest waivers or husbands to retract their consents. These
inabi I ities to retract, at least preinsemination, may run afoul of
constitutional procreation interests. Constitutional difficulties, due to the
lack of retraction opportunities on waivers and consents, are especially
likely where inseminations would come long after the waivers/consents
were first secured. Constitutional issues are far less likely to arise where
waiver/consent retractions, by statute, cannot be undertaken after a certain
period of time, which provides some assurance to a prospective birth
mother that the rug will not be pulled out from under her at the last
1110111 en t.
The 2017 UPA has no provisions on re tracting waivers by donors pre
or post insemination, 118 with the waivers of parental interests undertaken
preinsemination. 119 As for an individual who "consents ... to assisted
reproduction by a woman with the intent to be a parent," the 2017 UPA
115
I I(,
117

Hichael N . 49 1 US

118
119

1017 UP!\~ 701
2017 UP1\ ~ 101(9) (a do1101 is ·'an individual who provides gametes i111c11ded for use in

al

130

assi s1cd rq11uduc1iun'")
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allows such an individual to "withdraw consent at any time before a
transfer results in a prcgnancy.'' 120 The ability of an intended parent, but
not a donor, to undertake a preinsem ination retraction raises eyebrows. As
the Supreme Court declared, the right of privacy embodies individual
freedom from unwarranted governmental intrusion into decisions on
"whether to bear or beget a child." 121 Is a sperm donor who earlier agreed
to waive parental interests begetting a child? To facilitate family
planning, it would be sensible to al low a donor to retract a parental waiver
within a certain time after a donation is completed, and to allow an
intended parent to retract within so many days after consent is completed
or within so many days before insemination.
IV. CONCLUSION
American state AI laws vary greatly in their approaches to childcare
parentage. Too often they are fraught with due process, equal protection
and privacy problems, particularly for same-sex couples, wed or unwed,
and for single women. Illustrative is the Idaho Artificial Insemination Ac~
passed in 1982 and generally following the 1973 UP A. While the 201 7
UPA, followed in some states, is less troublesome, it too has problems in
its approach to parentage in AI births. Given separation of powers issues
in childcare parent cases, state commitments to democratic principles and
robust debate on public policy matters, and federal lawmakers' reluctance
to define parentage, state legislators should specially address childcare
parentage in artificial insemination birth settings.

120.
121

2017 UP A~ 707(a).

EisC11stad1, 405 U.S. at 453
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